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A STATE INCOME TAX AND THE MINNESOTA
CONSTITUTION
By HENRY ROTTSCHAEFER*
T HE Minnesota tax system dates back to a period when the
general property tax constituted the principal source of
revenue for state purposes throughout the United States. The con-
stitutional limitations upon the taxing power have been modified
from time to time, usually in the direction of permitting greater
legislative freedom in selecting principles for distributing the
tax burden.' This has permitted legislative adjustments intended
to adapt the general property tax system to changing conceptions
of proper policy in tax matters, and to deal with some of the most
glaring evils bred by that system. The only marked departure
from that system until within the last decade was the adoption
of the inheritance tax.2 The injection of new elements into our
tax system has proceeded more rapidly within the last few years
with the adoption of the occupation tax on mining and produc-
ing ores," the motor vehicle tax4 whose mongrel nature has caused
our supreme court considerable work5 and the excise tax on the
sale of gasoline.0 The statutes imposing the taxes last referred
*Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
'See H. F. Kumm, The Constitution of Minnesota Annotated,
160-185.2For a brief history of inheritance taxes in Minnesota see State
ex rel. Foot v. Bazille, (1905) 97 Minn. 11, 106 N. W. 93.
3Minn. const., art. 9, sec. 1A; Minn. Laws, 1921, chap. 223, Minn.
G. S. 1923, secs. 2373 et seq.
4Minn. const., art. 16, sec. 3; Minn. Laws, 1921, chap. 461, Minn.
G. S. 1923, secs. 2672 et. seq. The law has been several times amended
since its enactment.
GSee Raymond v. Holm, (1925) 165 Minn. 215, 206 N. W. 166,
and cases therein cited.
aMinn. const., art. 9, sec. 5, as amended in 1924; Minn. Laws,
1925, chap. 297.
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to followed the adoption of constitutional amendments whose
function was rather to allocate the proceeds of such taxes to pre-
scribed purposes than to remedy any defect in legislative power
to impose them, although the language of some of them sug-
gests the latter purpose also. It might almost be said that we are
acquiring a habit of amending our constitution whenever we wish
to resort to theretofore untouched sources of revenue. There has
been an even more recent instance of the same kind.7 Moreover,
when the question of a state income tax first received official
treatment a constitutional amendment providing for such a tax
was proposed but failed of adoption. The matter has recently been
brought before the public again by discussions before the Min-
nesota Tax Conference at its meeting last February at which
several speakers advocated a state income tax as a method of
spreading the tax burden more nearly in accordance with ability
to pay. It was also suggested as a possible escape from the
impasse in which the state finds itself in taxing national banks
as a result of the decision of the federal Supreme Court finding
its present system under existing circumstances violative of
Revised Statutes section 5219.8 It is, of course, inevitable that
the question will be raised as to whether the adoption of a state
income tax will require an amendment of the state constitution.
It is to this problem, rather than the policy of such a tax, that
the following discussion will be devoted.
Every exercise of the taxing power necessarily involves select-
ing a subject upon which to impose the tax. The adoption of an
income tax would involve selecting a subject heretofore left un-
touched by our state tax system. The nearest approach to such
a tax in the existing system is found in the various gross earnings
taxes, but these are in legal theory not taxes on such earnings
but on the property from which such earnings are derived meas-
ured by gross earnings instead of by its value.9 The first ques-
tion, therefore, is whether the state constitution prevents selecting
income as a tax subject. The answer depends on the source of
the taxing power and the function of the constitutional pro-
visions relating to it. The people of the state have nowhere in
the constitution specifically granted to any department of the
7Minn. const., art. 18, adopted 1926, provides for special method
of taxing forest lands and their products.8Minnesota v. First Nat. Bk. of St. Paul, (1927) 273 U. S. 561,
47 Sup. Ct. 468, 71 L. Ed. 774.9State v. U. S. Express Co., (1911) 114 Minn. 346, 131 N. W. 489.
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government any general power to tax. The power to impose
general property taxes is not expressly conferred; nor can it be
validly argued that it is impliedly conferred by the specification
that certain property shall be exempt."0 The only logical infer-
ence derivable from that fact is that there exists a power to tax
property, not that that power is conferred by the document. de-
creeing such exemption. Our present constitution nowhere
confers the power to impose inheritance taxes, but no one doubts
the constitutionality of selecting succession to the property of
decedents as a tax subject.:" As stated in State v. Wells Fargo
& Co.,' 2 "the taxing power is not conferred by the constitution,
but is only limited by it." This proposition would be clear beyond
the need for discussion were it not for the form of certain recent
constitutional amendments dealing with or affecting taxation.
Section 1A of article 9, dealing with the occupation tax on the
mining of ores, reads like a statute levying a tax rather than a
grant of power or a limitation on, or regulation of the exercise
of, an existing power. Section 3 of article 16, felating to motor
vehicle taxes, is ambiguous, but can be construed as both granting
a power to tax motor vehicles and prescribing a rule for the exer-
cise of such power. The amendment to section 5 of article 9,
ratified in 1924, specifically embodies a grant of power to impose
excises on the sales of gasoline. It is, of course, true that these
amendments in each case involved other matters of policy to
which it was desired to give that permanency derivable from
incorporation in constitutional form. The fact, however, remains
that the practice of including either the specific levy of a new
kind of tax or a grant of power to impose some new kind of
tax in constitutional amendments might lend specious support to
the contention that the like procedure was required to permit the
selection of income as a tax subject. It is, however, unlikely that
the court would hold this practice sufficient to overturn its prior
holdings as to the source of the taxing power and the function
of the constitutional provisions relating to it. This would be true
even were each instance of the practice interpretable only as
solely intended as a grant of power.
'0Minn constitution, art. 9, sec. 1.
"See state ex rel. Foot v. Bazille, (1905) 97 Minn. 11, 106 N. W.
93; Gaze v. Probate Court of Hennepin County, (1910) 112 Minn.
279, 128 N. W. 18.
12(1920) 146 Minn. 444, 454, 179 N. W. 221.
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It may, therefore, be concluded that the legislature can select
income as a tax subject unless some constitutional provision
expressly or impliedly prohibits it, despite the fact that no pro-
vision specifically or inferentially 'confers upon it that power. It
has that power for the same reasons and in the same sense that
it has the power to select property or inheritances as tax subjects.
There is nothing that specifically prohibits the selection of income
for taxation. None of the limitations specifically relating to the
taxing power could be reasonably construed to prevent its selec-
tion, nor is there anything in the past interpretations of our due
process clause on which the most optimistic opponent of income
taxes could reasonably rely to support a claim that the mere
selection of income for taxation would be unconstitutional. But
little light can be gained on this point from the authorities. In
some of the states having an income tax the constitution specifi-
cally authorizes it. In some of these, constitutional amendments
were adopted before enacting such taxes, usually in order to free
such taxes froni restrictions imposed on taxes generally which
were deemed to interfere with the kind of income tax demanded
by sound tax policy.13 There have been, and are, income taxes
in states that had, or have, no such constitutional provisions.".
The tax of one such state was assailed on the very score that
there was no authority conferred in the constitution to impose it.
The court answered that contention with the argument that the
state could levy the tax without special authority therefor unless
some provision of the constitution limited the kind of taxes that
could be imposed. It further denied that the mere use of the
term "property" in specifying the power to exempt from taxes
limited the state to selecting property as a tax subject. It accord-
ingly sustained the income tax.'5 The conclusion is, therefore,
warranted by both reason and authority that our state constitu-
tion does not prevent the selection of income as a tax subject.
The preceding discussion has assumed that an income tax
involves selecting income as the tax subject rather than its use
as the measure of a tax on something else as tax subject. The
nature of an income tax is a matter on which judicial opinions
differ.' 6 If considered as a property tax on the income itself as
13This was done in Massachusetts and Wisconsin.
"4Missouri, Delaware, and Mississippi may be cited as instances
of such states.
25State v. Pinder, (1919) 30 Del. 416, 108 Atd. 43.
16This matter will be subsequently dealt with in considering the
question of exemptions from income tax.
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a kind of property, it clearly involves selecting income as the tax
subject. The same would be true if it be viewed as a tax that
is sui generis. It has also been considered, in so far as it included
income from property, as a tax on the property from which such
income was derived. In that case income becomes the measure
of the tax on such property as the tax subject. Its use as such
measure could scarcely be questioned in Minnesota under a con-
stitution that permits the substitution of gross earnings for value
in measuring property taxes. An income tax has also been held
an excise tax on the activities producing the income. On such
view the act of engaging in income producing activities or of
receiving income is the tax subject and again income is the
measure of the tax. Our constitution imposes no restrictions on
the mere selection of a measure for a tax on a permissible tax
subject unless it be found in its due process clause, and the utmost
restriction that could be therein discovered is that the measure
adopted be reasonable. It is eminently so to measure a tax on
the prosecution of income producing activities by the net income
derived therefrom, and, therefore, its adoption would be con-
stitutional. No case has been found treating this specific matter
from this angle, but the fact that income taxes have been sustained
even where the state constitution contained no grant of power to
impose them affords some basis for holding that the point, if
raised, would be decided according to the views herein stated.
It may, therefore, be taken as established that our present
constitution permits the selection of income as a tax subject, or
its use as a measure either of a tax on income producing property
or of an excise on the prosecution of income producing activities,
including that of receiving income. A law taxing all net incomes,
without exempting any part of the net income of any person,
at a single uniform rate would be valid. Such a tax would, hoiv-
ever, run counter to current notions as to what constitutes desir-
able policy in income taxation. The real problem is not as to
the power to impose some kind of income tax, but as to the
constitutionality of an income tax at progressive rates under a
statute granting exemptions of limited aimounts of net income to
all within the law. It is also quite probable that the legislature
might desire for sound reasons of policy to exempt all income
received by certain persons such as educational institutions and
the like. Such a statute, considered by itself without reference
to the problems its introduction into the tax system might raise
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as to the validity of the resulting system, would raise several quite
distinct constitutional issues: (1) The validity of increasing the
rate of the tax according to the size of the net income; (2) the
validity of exempting a limited portion of the nef income of all
those subject to the tax; and (3) the validity of completely
exempting certain groups from the tax. The only provisions of
the state constitution that have any bearing on these particular
problems are article 4, section 33, which provides that "The
legislature shall pass no local or special law . . . exempting
property from taxation," and article 9, section 1, which "requires
taxes to be "uniform upon the same class of subjects" and which
specifies the property that shall be exempt. Its due process clause
has thus far received no interpretation suggesting that it is a
limit on the legislative power to classify and grant exemptions
for tax purposes, and the existence of the specific provisions
relating thereto, which have just been set forth, renders such use
of the due process clause highly improbable. It may, therefore,
be ignored in the discussions.
The validity of taxing incomes of different amounts at vary-
ing rates depends upon the extent of the classification permissible
under the provision requiring taxes to be "uniform upon the
same class of subjects." This requirement of our constitution
applies to all kinds of taxes, and would, therefore, be applicable
to an income tax irrespective of its nature. The intelligent con-
sideration of this problem requires a preliminary analysis to
determine exactly what kind of classes would result from the
employment of the proposed method of taxation. The actual
results will depend upon which of two quite distinct methods for
varying the rate with the amount of income is adopted. One of
these consists in imposing a tax at a given rate upon the whole
net income up to and including a stated amount, and at a higher
rate upon the whole net income if that exceeds that amount. A
case of that kind would be a statute that taxed all incomes 7 of
$10,000 or less at 1 per cent, and all incomes in excess of $10,000
at 2 per cent. A person with $10,000 income would pay a tax
of $100; a person with $10,001 would pay a tax of $200.02. The
division into classes for tax rate purposes is based solely on the
size of total incomes, and involves taxing a given amount of
income in certain cases at varying rates that depend upon the
17 The term "income" will hereafter be used in the sense of "net
income" unless specified to the contrary.
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total income of which it forms a part. The other method consists
in taxing at a given rate income up to and including a stated
amount, and at a higher rate a defined increment of income above
such amount. A statute of this type would, for example, tax at
1 per cent the first $10,000 or less of any income, and at 2 per
cent the portion thereof in excess of $10,000. A person with
$10,000 of income would pay $100; one with an income of $10,001
would pay 1 per cent on the first $10,000, and 2 per cent on the
remaining $1, or $100.02. It would seem on its face as if this
did not involve varying the rate on a given amount of income
according to the total income of which it formed a part, but this
is true only if attention is limited to the crude rate applicable
to the different income increments. The effective rate, that is,
the rate that the total tax bears to the total taxed income, does
vary as between total incomes according as they are comprised
of different numbers of income increments carrying different
rates,', and even as between total incomes comprised of the same
number of such increments, the larger total income bearing the
higher effective rate. 19 Since the number of increments can
increase only as total income increases, the net result is that the ef-
fective rate increases as total income increases except in the case of
increases within the first or lowest rate increment. But that
means that, with the exception indicated, the significant rate
applicable to any given amount of income does vary according
to the size of the total income of which it is a part. The reason
why no such reasoning was required in dealing with this aspect
of the former method was because the statutory crude rates are
identical with the effective rates. The foregoing considerations
also show that the second method also involves a division into
classes for tax rate purposes that is ultimately based solely on
the size of total incomes. It differs from the former in this
IsThe following illustration, based on the statute last mentioned
in the paragraph, will make this clear. A has an income of $9,000;
his tax at 1 per cent is $90; its effective rate, 1 per cent. B has an
income of $15,000; his total tax is 1 per cent of $10,000 plus 2 per cent
of $5,000, or $200; its effective rate is 1.33+ per cent. That this is
true for all conceivable cases is mathematically demonstrable.
'
9 The following illustration, based on the statute last mentioned
in the paragraph, will make this clear. A has an income of $15,000;
his total tax is 1 per cent of $10,000 plus 2 per cent of $5,000, or
$200; its effective rate is 1.33+ per cent. B has an income of $20,000;
his total tax is 1 per cent of $10,000 plus 2 per cent of $10,000, or $300;
its effective rate is 1.5 per cent. A's income and B's income were
each comprised of two income increments. That this is true for all
conceivable cases is mathematically demonstrable.
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respect only in the device through which that effect is produced,
but resort to that device raises a difficulty of determining just
what are the classes created that will be later considered. It is
apparent, therefore, that the adoption of either of these methods
involves classification on the basis of the size of total incomes
for tax rate purposes, that both involve increases in effective
rates as the size of total incomes increase, and that under each
method the effective rate on a given amount of income varies
directly with the size of the total income of which it is a part.
The question, therefore, is whether our uniformity clause permits
using size of incomes as a basis of classification when its use
produces the differences indicated in the analysis just made.
It has been stated by our supreme court that the amendment
to section 1 of article 9 of the state constitution which substituted
the requirement that taxes should be "uniform upon the same
class of subjects" for one that they should be "as nearly equal
as may be," removed some of the restrictions theretofore imposed
upon the taxing power.20  It follows that decisions holding that
the provision as it stood prior to 1906 had been violated have
practically no value in determining what the'present clause per-
mits, although it is almost certain that a classification valid prior
to 1906 would be valid thereafter. The language of the two pro-
visions is, however, so different that it seems desirable to discuss
the problems of classification involved in a graduated progressive
income tax by reference to the principles developed in interpreting
the 1906 amendment. The same kind of considerations make it
desirable to-limit the reference to cases from other jurisdictions
to states whose constitutional provisions are identical with or
quite similar to that in our own constitution, and this will be
done throughout unless the contrary is specifically indicated.
Federal decisions interpreting the uniformity requirement imposed
on excises by the federal constitution would, for instance, be quite
worthless in deciding what our uniformity clause permits, since
the function of the former is extremely limited as compared with
the scope of our own provision. And the same is true, although
to a lesser extent, of the provisions in many state constitutions
that define the legislative power to classify for tax purposes.
The true limits imposed on the power to classify for tax
purposes can be defined only by considering the function of the
2
°Mutual Benefit Ins. Co. v. County of Martin, (1908) 104 Minn.
179, 116 N. W. 572.
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limiting clauses and the problem with which they are concerned.
That problem is wholly that of distributing the tax burden, and
uniformity clauses operate to limit the legislative selection of
principles for so doing. The general standard to which such
selection must conform in order to comply with the uniformity
requirement is that the resulting classifications shall be reason-
able.21  The legislative classification is binding on the courts
"unless clearly fanciful and arbitrary. '22  Our supreme court
has frequently cited decisions of the United States Supreme
Court on the validity of classifications for tax purposes under
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment in
deciding like problems under our uniformity clause.23  The
federal Supreme Court has also said of our uniformity clause
that it seems to it to go "no further than the fourteenth amend-
ment.124 It is a fair inference from these facts that the principles
determining the validity of tax classifications under the two pro-
visions are fundamentally the same. That principle was defined
in the case last cited as requiring the legislature only to "refrain
from clear and hostile discrimination against particular persons
or classes." The same principles are constantly announced by
courts in other states having similar constitutional provisions. It
may, therefore, be taken as established that our uniformity clause
permits classifications for tax purposes if they are reasonable,
not fanciful, and involve no hostile discrimination against par-
ticular persons or classes, and that these furnish the ultimate
measure of validity whether the tax be on property or on the
oxercise of a privilege that is itself the creature of statute as in
the case of inheritance taxes.
But these principles constitute no more than a starting point
when the issue is as to the validity of a particular classification for
the purposes of a particular kind of tax. The problem of their
application to such a specific case involves difficulties that far
transcend their own derivation from the cases. It is a problem
21Mutual Benefit Ins. Co. v. County of Martin, (1908) 104 Minn.
179, 116 N. W. 572.22Raymond v. Holm, (1925) 165 Minn. 215, 206 N. W. 166.23See for example State ex rel. St. P. City Ry. Co. v. Minn. Tax
Commission, (1915) 128 Minn. 384, 150 N. W. 1087. The Oregon court
has treated-the limits imposed on tax classification by its "uniform
upon same class of subjects" provision as practically those imposed
by the equal protection clause of amendment 14; Standard Lbr. Co. v.
Pierce, (1924) 112 Or. 314, 228 Pac. 812.24Lake Superior Consol. Iron. Mines v. Lord, (1925) 271 U. S.
577, 46 Sup. Ct. 627, 70 L. Ed. 1093.
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that is all too frequently avoided by the positive assertion and
reiteration of the proposition in dispute. The reason is that the
judgment that a specific case conforms or fails to conform to the
standard of reasonableness invariably involves mental processes
not reducible to logical propositional form. The standard is not
a completely determined major premise, but a variable depending
in some measure upon elements that are frequently specific to
the particular instance being judged. This factor makes com-
plete logical consistency in the whole body of decisions incor-
porating judgments of this character quite out of the question,
as the diversity in actual results clearly shows. It would be
easy, but inaccurate, to conclude from this that each such decision
is the result of a process in which the non-logical elements have
been the sole determining factors; the probable truth is that
logical and rational factors enter into the process as limits on
the scope and effect produced by the non-logical elements. On
the former assumption it would be futile to rely on past decisions
in determining the validity of a new specific instance of tax
classification; on the latter prior decisions acquire at least some
significance, even though it cannot be expressed in an exact
mathematical formula. The discussion will proceed on the
assumption that prior judicial pronouncements as to the principles
governing the validity of tax classifications and their prior appli-
cations of such principles to specific cases, are at Mast as valuable
in predicting judicial action on the constitutionality of a graduated
progressive income tax as biographical studies of the personnel
of courts. But its employment is useful only if it transcends the
derivation of those general and vague principles that have been
described above as starting points, and enters into an analysis
of the process by which these receive specific content in their
application. That is largely a matter of discovering the facts
.and factors relied on in reaching the final judgment.
The most important single factor in determining whether a
classification is reasonable is the purpose for which, or the prob-
lem in connection with which, it is made. It is, for example,
perfectly valid to put aliens into a class when it is a question
of shooting wild game,2 5 but not when it is a question of the
right to pursue the ordinary methods of gaining a livelihood.28
25Patsone v. Penn, (1914) 232 U. S. 138, 34 Sup. Ct. 281, 58 L.
Ed. 539.26Truax v. Raich, (1915) 239 U. S. 33, 36 Sup. Ct. 7, 60 L. Ed. 131.
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It follows, therefore, that the reasonableness of a tax classifica-
tion must take account of the fact that it is really a question of
what constitutes a reasonable basis for distributing the burden
of supporting a government from whose activities all presumably
derive some benefit. The specific factors to which courts have
assigned significance in reaching conclusions on this matter have
been many. Some of them are scarcely applicable-to the instant
problem, and will be considered only in so far as they might
furnish a basis for doubting the validity of a progressive income
tax. Considerations of public policy are a legitimate factor in
classifying for tax purposes.27 The Pennsylvania court has said
in construing the validity of classifications under its "uniform
upon the same class of subjects" provision, that these "may be
based upon well grounded considerations of public policy." 28 It
has also been invoked to sustain classifications in imposing excise
taxes in states whose constitutional provisions, identical in terms
with our own, applied to such taxes.2  The exemption of incomes
under $1000 from the Delaware income tax, which of course in-
volved a classification into those liable and those not liable to tax,
was sustained partly because "the Legislature might very well have
thought that such exemption would best promote the public wel-
fare ;-*0 the language of the Delaware uniformity clause, which ap-
plied to all taxes, was identical with our own. The conception of
public policy includes a wide variety of specific objects; the best
characterization of it in connection with taxation is that of the
United States Supreme Court in sustaining against an objection
based on the equal protection clause a classification for inheritance
tax purposes: "Any classification is permissible which has a reas-
onable relation to some permitted end of governmental action." 3'
That is to say, a state can use its power to classify for tax pur-
poses as an instrument of policy, and act on its view of what it
might fairly deem desirable policy in distributing taxes. It can,
27 %futual Benefit Ins. Co. v. County of Martin, (1908) 104 Minn.
179, 116 N. W. 572.28Comm. v. Delaware Division Canal Co., (1889) 123 Pa. St. 594,
621, 16 At]. 584, 2 L. R. A. 798.2 Rosenbloom v. State, (1902) 64 Neb. 342, 89 N. W. 1053, 57
L. R A. 922 In re Gross Production Tax of Wolverine Oil Co., (1906)
53 Okla. 24, 154 Pac. 362.
3°State v. Pinder, (1919) 30 Del. 416, 108 Atl. 43. See also Lud-
low-Saylor Wire Co. v. Wollbrinck, (1918) 275 Mo. 339, 205 S. W.
196. 31Watson v. State Comptroller, (1920) 254 U. S. 122, 41 Sup. Ct.
43, 65 L. Ed. 170.
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for example, without denying equal protection, seek to discourage
holding companies by taxing corporate shares held by corporations
but not those held by individuals.3 2 Judicial decision in thus recog-
nizing the significance of factors of policy is but reflecting the best
thought of writers on public finance and the accepted practices of
governments. 3 It is clear, therefore, that the question of the
validity of progressive income taxes cannot be intelligently ap-
proached without considering the whole problem of what con-
stitute the significant bases for distributing tax burdens. To ex-
clude it would involve eliminating that factor of the problem
which would seem to be most relevant to a judgment as to the
reasonableness of a proposed classification, and would involve
a repudiation of the recognized principle that the reasonableness
of a classification depends on its purpose, as well as of the cases
recognizing the supreme importance of the factor of public policy.
There are three well recognized theories as to what constitute
proper bases for distributing taxes. One of these is the benefit
theory. It is frequently invoked by courts in dealing with prob-
lems of jurisdiction to tax, 4 and in determining whether the es-
tablishment of tax districts conforms with the provisions of uni-
formity, equal protection, and due process clauses. 35 It was re-
ferred to as a factor in sustaining the mortgage registry tax,38
and is really back of the reasoning sustaining the classification for
wheelage tax purposes sustained in Park v. City of Duluth. 7 The
second of these theories is the ability theory. Our court has said
of this theory:
"Ability or faculty to pay has come to be the test in determin-
ing the justness of taxation ...The equity and fairness of this
theory, in its broadest sense, when we reflect upon the vast for-
tunes accumulated as the result of especially advantageous op-
portunities and facilities, not possessed by people in general, is
32Fort Smith Lbr. Co. v. Arkansas, (1920) 251 U. S. 532, 40 Sup.
Ct. 304, 64 L. Ed. 396.33Seligman, Essays in Taxation, 9th ed.
34See Cook v. Tait, (1924) 265 U. S. 47,44 Sup. Ct. 444, 68 L. Ed. 895.35Maltby v. Tautges, (1892) 50 Minn. 248, 52 N. W. 858; Wilson
v. Lambert, (1897) 168 U. S. 611, 18 Sup. Ct. 217, 42 L. Ed. 599. Myles
Salt -Co. v. Iberia & St. Mary Drainage Dist., (1916) 239 U. S. 478,
36 Sup. Ct. 204, 60 L. Ed. 392.
88Mutual Benefit Ins. Co. v. County of Martin, (1908) 104 Minn.
179, 116 N. W. 572.
87(1916) 134 Minn. 296, 159 N. W. 627. While notoso evident, there
is an element of this theory in the reasoning sustaining the various
classifications of trucks for motor vehicle tax purposes sustained in
Raymond v. Holm, (1925) 165 Minn. 215, 206 N. W. 166, and McReavy
v. Holm, (1926) 166 Minn. 22, 206 N. W. 942.
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apparent and obvious. It works no injustice or harm to those thus
fortunately situated, does not injuriously affect production or in-
dustrial agencies, and relieves in a measure those with lesser op-
portunities, and those to whom taxation is always an extreme
burden."' 8
This statement, though not the basis for the decision sustaining
progressive inheritance taxation since the constitution at that time
specifically permitted that, is clear indication of the court's atti-
tude toward the ability theory as a factor for tax classifications.
It has received little explicit recognition in deciding cases under the
existing uniformity clause;39 the decisions have usually invoked
other factors more directly suggested by the classifications in-
volved in the cases. It has, however, been extensively relied on
in other jurisdictions. A statute that divided gold and silver mines
into producing and non-producing for purposes of applying .to
the two classes different bases of assessment was held not to
violate a provision requiring taxes to be uniform on the same class
of subjects since it in general divided mines on the basis of their
profitableness or unprofitableness, a clear reference to the ability
theory.40 . The relative productivity of different kinds of property
was referred to as a factor in sustaining a statute for applying
different rates of assessment to different kinds 'of property under
an identical uniformity clause and also the equal protection clause.4 1
The Wisconsin supreme court has stated in sustaining the validity
of certain classifications made by its Soldiers' Bonus income tax
law that "the legislature had a right to take into account in levy-
ing the burdens who was best able to pay." 42 The same theory
is at the basis of the reasoning by w'hich the Mississippi court
sustains graduated income taxes as not violating the constitution-
al provision that "taxation shall be equal and uniform throug-
out the state" and the equal protection clause, in so far as it
supports the principle of graduation by quoting from cases the
statement that proportional taxation seldom produces equality of
sacrifice.43 The exemption of incomes of $1000 or less from an
33State ex rel. Foot v. Bazille, (1905) 97 Minn. 11, 106 N. W. 93.39It is referred to in Mutual Benefit Ins. Co. v. County of Martin,
(1908) 104 Minn. 179, 116 N. W. 572.4
°Foster v. Hart Mining Co., (1912) 52 Colo. 459, 122 Pac. 48..41Hilger v. Moore, (1919) 56 Mont. 146, 182 Pac. 477.42State v. Johnson, (1919) 170 Wis. 218, 175 N. W. 589. It should
be noted that the Wisconsin uniformity clause does not apply to in-
come taxes. The opinion does not indicate what constitutional pro-
visions the court had in mind in discussing the problem of classifi-
cation.43State v. Gulf, M. & N. R. Co., (1925) 138 Miss. 70, 104 So. 689.
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income tax was held not to violate a requirement that taxes
should be uniform upon the same class of subjects because "It
was a proper and reasonable classification of persons whose in-
comes are very limited." 44 There are cases in which the ability
theory has been invoked by the federal Supreme Court to sustain
tax classifications against objections based on the equal protec-
tion clause.45
The last theory is that taxes should be so distributed as to
promote desirable social policy, and in the light of the probable
social consequences of different methods of their distribution.
It was shown in a preceding paragraph that this has received
judicial recognition, including that by our own supreme court.
The governmental and social purposes that may be thus promoted
have never yet, and probably never can be, completely determined.
That they include distributing taxes on the basis of-ability to pay
is clear from what has just been said. A state can subject to
special tax burdens property that depletes since that depletion
involves a permanent diminution of taxable property for the
future; that is, it can use its power of classification to carry out
a policy of grabbing while the grabbing is good.46 To impose a
special tax on anthracite, but not on bituminous coal, was held
not to deny equal protection partly because of the difference in
use in so far as that bore on the state's policy in developing other
industries.4 7 The exemption of peddlers vending their own prod-
ucts from a license tax on peddlers was held not to violate a re-
quirement that excises be uniform as to the class on which they
operated, because the exempted group was held to be engaged
in activities promotive of good social policy.4 18 The prevention
of the pauperization of the small income class was held a reason
why granting an exemption of $1000 in an income tax did not
44State v. Pinder, (1919) 30 Del. 416, 108 Atl. 43. It should be
stated that the Delaware constitution specifically authorized the leg-
islature, by general laws, to exempt such property as in its opinion
would best promote the general welfare, and that this case held an
income tax to be a property tax on the income as property.4SCitizens Tel. Co. v. Fuller, (1913) 229 U. S. 322, 33 Sup. Ct. 833,
57 L. Ed. 1206.46Lake Superior Consol. Iron Mines v. Lord, (1925) 271 U. S.
577,-46 Sup. Ct. 627, 70 L. Ed. 1093.47Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., (1922) 260 U. S. 245, 43 Sup.
Ct. 83, 67 L. Ed. 237. See same case in 274 Pa. St. 448, in which the
tax was sustained under the constitutional provision that taxes should
be uniform upon the same class of subjects.48Rosenbloom v. State, (1902) 64 Neb. 342, 89 N. W. 1053, 57 L.
R. A. 922.
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violate equal protection. 9 It is clear from these cases that the
equal protection clause and uniformity clauses similar to our
own permit a state to adjust its distribution of taxes so as to
promote its views of desirable social policy, and that courts are ex-
tremely loath to circumscribe the elements of policy that it can
thus promote. Anyone is privileged to claim that these are not
strictly speaking legal theories of taxation, but this must not be
equated with a denial of their judicial recognition as significant in
deciding questions of tax classification. Such claim, therefore,
would leave intact resort to such theories in passing on such a
question.
The theory most relevant to the problem of progressive in-
come tax rates is the ability theory. An income tax at a flat rate
does distribute taxes with some regard to ability to pay, but pro-
gressive rates are a more highly perfected device for securing
that result in so far as they include equality of sacrifice as an ele-
ment in measuring ability to pay. Every case, therefore, in which
a classification has been sustained by reasoning that included a
reference to that theory is to that extent a ground for concluding
that progressive rates are valid. The conclusion is not, of course,.
a logical necessity for it has never yet been stated by any court
that every classification that conforms to this principle is valid.
The number of instances in which it has been invoked to sustain
classifications, however, makes it highly probable that another
classification producing the same kind of result will be sustained
as valid. The degree of that probability depends in part upon
whether judicial reference to other factors in connection with
questions of this character can be construed as interposing a bar
to giving the ability theory its natural scope. The theory that the
power to make tax classifications may be used as an instrument
of policy enhances, rather than weakens, the conclusion that pro-
gressive income tax rates are valid. A factor frequently relied
on to justify classification in connection with property taxes is
the difference in the nature and character of property put into
different classes. It was an important factor in sustaining our three
mill tax on money and credits,=0 and the assessment of different
kinds of property at different percentages of their actual value.5'
49W. C. Peacock & Co. v. Pratt (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1903) 121 Fed.
772, 58 C. C. A. 48.
"
0State ex rel. Winona Motor Co. v. Minn. Tax Commission,
(1912) 117 Minn. 159, 134 N. W. 643.51State ex rel. St. P. City Ry. Co. v. Minn. Tax Commission,
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The typical progressive rate feature of an income tax effects a
classification that has no reference whatever to differences in the
nature and character of the units includible in the different classes,
unless "nature and character" be given a somewhat unusual in-
terpretation. 52 The factual differences intended have received
practically no- discussion, although the mere physical differences
between them have been relied on to justify taxing anthracite,
but not bituminous coal, against an objection based on the equal
protection clause. 53 The idea would be meaningless as a basis for
sustaining tax classifications if it referred to differences in the
legal nature of property unless the concept "legal nature" excluded
the position of the property for tax purposes. The cases invok-
ing this factor show clearly that the intended differences have no
reference to differences in the content of the right of property
as regards its different objects resulting from differences in the
extent of their regulation by the state. The differences actually
intended seem to refer to mere physical differences or that desig-
nated by the terms tangible and intangible, as these are ordinarily
used.
It is difficult to see how these, except as indexes to more sig-
nificant differences such as of use, have any rational, connection
with sound tax policy, but the position of such differences as
factors is too well established to be denied. But that means only
that such differences justify tax classifications, not that such dif-
ferences must exist if such a classification is to be valid. The
language in Mutual Benefit Ins. Co. v. County of Martin,"- that
classification must be "such as is suggested by essential differences
of nature" is erroneous in its implications and not in accord with
prevailing authorities.55 It is, therefore, no proof of the invalidity
(1915) 128 Minn. 384, 150 N. W. 1087; Hilger v. Moore, (1919) 56
Mont. 146, 182 Pac. 477. (The Montana constitution required taxes
to be uniform upon same class of subjects.)52An income tax that taxed at different rates income received in
the form of money and that received in some form of property other
than money wbuld involve a classification based on differences in the
nature and character of the incomes to at least as great an extent as
would be true of a classification of property such as is made by our
statute classifying property for purposes of assessment.53Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., (1922) 260 U. S. 245, 43"Sup.
Ct. 83, 67 L. Ed. 237, which affirmed 274 Pa. St. 448 in which said
tax was also sustained as not violating the state constitutional pro-
vision requiring taxes to be uniform upon the same class of subjects.
54(1908) 104 Minn. 179, 116 N. W. 572.55See Comm. v. Delaware Division Canal Co., (1889) 123 Pa. St.
594, 621, 16 Atl. 584, 2 L. R. A. 798. (For provisions of Penn. consti-
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of progressive income tax rates that all dollars of income, whether
the first or the millionth, are alike. This may quite well be true
from some points of view, but, unless those points of view are
the solely decisive ones when the question concerns what treat-
ment may be accorded them for income tax purposes under our
uniformity clause, this fact is quite irrelevant; and that, as has
been shown, is the case. It is equally true that from some points
of view a dollar of value in the form of tangible property is like a
dollar of value in the form of a credit, but that has not prevented
our uniformity clause from permitting the latter to be taxed at a
lower rate than the former. The uniformity clause does not re-
quire that every factor that has ever been invoked to sustain a
classification under it be applicable to every problem of classifica-
tion. It would be unreasonable to hold progressive income tax
rates invalid because the units in the various classes resulting
therefrom did not differ in nature and character, whatever that
may mean, although the classification conformed exactly with a
standard employed by the court which is much more fundamental
in tax matters. The situation under our inheritance tax is exactly
similar to what would be the situation under a progressive in-
come tax, and, as will appear later, the parallel cannot be waved
aside by the theory that the former tax is an excise on a priv-
ilege conferred by the state. The "difference in nature and char-
acter" factor, therefore, is no barrier to carrying to its natural
consequences the principle that a tax classification is valid that
produces a distribution of tax burdens in accordance with ability
to pay, and thereby sustaining the progressive rate feature of an
income tax under our uniformity clause.
It has already been shown that the progressive rate feature as
such produces classes differentiated by the factor of size. Courts
have at times taken a rather critical attitude toward classifications
based on size, whether for tax or police power purposes.5" The
objection, however, has been to situations in which the classifi-
cations were based solely on size.5 7 A classification for police
tution see footnote 53); Hilger v. Moore, (1919) 56 Mont. 146, 182
Pac. 477. (Montana constitutional provision identical with our own);
Watson v. State Comptroller, (1920) 254 U. S. 122, 41 Sup. Ct. 43,
65 L. Ed. 170. (Equal protection clause.)5GEstate of Cope, (1899) 191 Pa. St. 1, 43 Atl. 79, 45 L. R. A. 316,
71 Am. St. Rep. 749 (tax); Cotting v. Kas. City Stockyards Co.,
(1901) 183 U. S. 79, 22 Sup. Ct. 30, 46 L. Ed. 92.57Estate of Cope, (1899) 191 Pa. St. 1, 43 Atl. 79, 45 L. R. A.
316, 71 Am. St. Rep. 749.
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power purposes does not violate equal protection though based on
size if size is an index of an evil that a state may deal with ;5S
that a classification for tax purposes based on size is valid under
equal protection and uniformity clauses if size is an index of a
factor justifying such classification is shown by the many in-
stances in which it has been sustained. The relative sizes of in-
comes is clearly an index of the relative abilities of their recipients
to pay taxes, and that alone should suffice to dispel any notion that
progressive rates would be invalid because the resulting classifi-
cations do rest on size. Uniformity clauses are intended to pre-
vent certain results. The question is whether these include in-
creasing the tax rate with increases in the amount of the thing
taxed. A state, whose constitution required taxes to be uniform
upon the same class of subjects, divided gold and silver mines into
those with a gross annual production of $5000 or more and those
with a gross annual production of less than $5000, for purposes
of applying different methods of assessment which would produce
corresponding differences in the effective tax rates. The statute
was sustained in an opinion that relies in part upon the ability
theory, although of course it did effect a direct variation in rate
with the amount of the things taxed. 9 It is well recognized that a
provision requiring taxes to be uniform and equal confines classi-
fication within narrower bounds than does a provision such as our
uniformity clause. Despite that, a statute has been held not to vio-
late such a clause which exempted $500 worth of household goods
although the court explicitly admitted that its necessary mathe-
matical effect was to increase the effective tax rate as the amount
of assessable property increased.60 An almost similar clause was
held not to be violated by a statute permitting the deduction in
assessing real estate of mortgage debts up to the value of $700
although the necessary effect would be differences in effective
tax rates of property of the same kind even of the same value
unless mortgaged to exactly the same amount.6'
The progressive inheritance tax produces exactly the results
being discussed, and these have been almost universally sustained.
If our uniformity clause permits that tax, and that is not likely
58Engel v. O'Malley, (1911) 219 U. S. 128, 31 Sup. Ct. 190, 55
L. Ed. 128.59Foster v. Hart Mining Co., (1912) 52 Colo. 459, 122 Pac. 48.
6OCity of New Orleans v. Fourchy, (1878) 30 La. Ann. 910.
61State ex rel. Lewis et al. v. Smith, (1901) 158 Ind. 543, 63 N. E.
25, 214, 64 N. E. 18, 63 L. R. A. 116.
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to be questioned at this late date, it should permit progressive
income taxes unless the two kinds of taxes are so different in
respect of some feature that may reasonably be held determina-
tive in this connection, as to require the constitution to be given
different meanings in dealing with them. It has been suggested
more than once that such difference is found in the fact that in-
heritance taxes are on a privilege conferred by the state. Our
uniformity clause applies to all taxes, including inheritance taxes.
The fact that it is a tax on a privilege, therefore, cannot be held
to give the legislature the power of unlimited classification even
for such a tax. This is exactly the position of the federal Su-
preme Court taken in the Magoun Case, which involved the
validity of progressive inheritance taxes under the equal protec-
tion clause, that the state must treat all in the same circum-
stances alike even in conferring privileges.62 If then said differ-
ence has any significance it must mean that the courts would
permit greater legislative freedom in classifying for purposes
of inheritance taxes than for income taxes. Such authority as
there is on this matter is clearly to the contrary. A graduated
income tax has been held not to violate a provision requiring
taxation to be equal and uniform because, among other reasons
including reference to the Magoun Case, "In so far as the prin-
ciple of equality is concerned, there is no difference between a
graduated income tax and a graduated privilege tax." 63 An Ore-
gon graduated income tax was held not to violate a requirement
that taxes be uniform upon the same class of subjects by an argu-
ment that relies heavily upon a prior state decision sustaining
progressive inheritance taxes.64 Our supreme court has said in
discussing progressive inheritance taxes:
"The progressive rule is applied to income tax, which in
principle is identical with the inheritance tax; the only difference
being that the income tax is one upon property, while the in-
heritance tax is upon the right of succession."'6 5
The difference, such as it is, has accordingly no bearing upon
the problem under discussion, and hence it is practically certain
that our uniformity clause interposes no greater barrier to pro-
gressive income taxes than to progressive inheritance taxes.
62Magoun v. Ill. Trust & Savings 3ank, (1898) 170 U. S. 283, 18
Sup. Ct. 594, 42 L. Ed. 1037.03State.v. Gulf, M. & N. R. Co., (1925) 138 Miss. 70, 104 So. 689.
"
4Standard Lbr. Co. v. Pierce, (1924) 112 Or. 314, 228 Pac. 812.6 State ex rel. Foot v. Bazille, (1905) 97 Minn. 11, 106 N. W. 93.
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Moreover the effect of our money and credits tax, and of the
statutes classifying property for purposes of assessment, produce
higher effective tax rates on property of the same value, and these
have both been sustained although their results are much more
arbitrary than those produced by progressive income tax rates. Our
mortgage registry tax, in so far as it levies a specific sum upon
each one hundred dollars or fraction thereof of the value of the
secured debt, actually results in a degressive effective rate as
between secured debts consisting of the same number of hundreds
of dollars but differing in their remaining units, but that law
too has been sustained. It is immaterial for present purposes
that the three provisions last referred to deal with classes of
property that are in some respects and from some points of
view quite different in nature. The point is that a classification
for tax purposes that can be sustained by reference to a factor
that courts have determined to be significant in such problems,
is not invalid merely because it results in different rates of tax
either on equal amounts of dissimilar units or on unequal amounts
of similar units. It has already been shown that the "ability"
principle justifies progressive rates on income, and hence these
are not invalid because they measure tax rates by reference to
the amount of taxed units.68
Attention was hereinbefore called to the two methods by
which income tax rates might be varied according to the size of
the incomes. The discussion thus far is equally applicable which-
ever method be adopted. If, however, increasing rates apply
only to successive increments of income instead of to the total
66It is, of course, apparent that the logic of these considerations
would support ad valorem property taxes at progressive rates. It is,
however, unlikely that our court would hold.that our uniformity clause
permitted this. The reason would probably be that this would in-
volve too radical a departure from accepted notions, a factor that
would not militate against progressive income taxes. It would, how-
ever, be incorrect to argue backward from the probable decision
on such a tax to the conclusion that progressive income taxes would
be ihvalid; that process would ultimately lead to the conclusion, con-
trary to actual decision, that progressive inheritance taxes were in-
valid. The truth is that logic is but one factor in the problem, and
the effect of the argument in the text is not absolute certainty orlogical necessity, but a high degree of probability that a court would
sustain progressive income taxes. It seems quite desirable to riddiscussions as to the meaning of broadly phrased constitutional pro-
visions of a latent dogmatism based on an assumption that such
phrases have a fixed meaning ascertainable by applying to them a
purely logical process. Nothing in the results, or the process as thus
far revealed, warrants such a view.
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income as that increases, what appears like a difficulty arises. If
all incomes are deemed to belong to the same class that are com-
posed of the same number of such successive increments, then
the effective rates on incomes belonging to the same class are
not equal . 7  There would not be exact mathematical equality
among the members of the same class. It has been said that our
uniformity clause requires all within the same class to be equally
treated. 8 This is the invariable requirement for classification
under practically all constitutional provisions relating to that mat-
ter. That this does not require exact mathematical equality is
shown by the fact that the inheritance tax and the mortgage reg-
istry tax are valid though they involve similar inequalities. It
is also proved by the cases sustaining progressive income taxes
referred to in the next paragraph. However, the results pro-
duced by progressive rates might equally well be construed as
involving the creation of as many classes as there are sizes of
income, and in that case the progressive rate system secures
even mathematical equality among the members of the class.
Irrespective, there.fore, of which of these theories be adopted, the
results do not involve inequality among the members of the same
class as that conception is understood in constitutional law.
Progressive income taxes have been sustained in states whose
constitutions required taxes to be uniform and equal, or uniform
upon the same class of subject. Cases from states whose constitu-
tions specifically permit graduated progressive income taxation have
no relevance to this discussion and will be omitted. 9 Such taxes
have been held not to violate a constitutional requirement that
"taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the state."70 One
of the judges stated that they offended his sense of equal and
just taxation, but concurred because he deemed the principle
too firmly established. They have been sustained in Oregon
where the constitution required taxation to be uniform upon the
same class of subjects.71 The opinions in both these cases rely
upon cases sustaining progressive inheritance taxes, refer to the
fact that federal progressive income taxes have been sustained,
67See footnote 19.
OsMutual Benefit Ins. Co. v. County of Martin, (1908) 104 Minn.
179, 116 N. W. 572.6 9Such cases are State v. Frear, (1912) 148 Wis. 456, 134 N. W.
673, 135 N. W. 164. Alderman v. Wells, (1910) 85 S. C. 507, 67 S. E.
781.
'
TOState v. Gulf, M. & N. R. Co., (1925) 138 Miss. 70, 104 So. 689.71Standard Lbr. Co. v. Pierce, (1924) 112 Or. 314, 228 Pac. 812.
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and support their judgment that such classifications are reason-
able by the fact that they have been approved in practice by
many enlightened governments. The effect of permitting a lim-
ited amount of all net incomes to be exempt is to produce just
that variation of tax rate with the size of incomes that consti-
tutes the essential feature of progressive rates. This has been
held to violate neither a uniformity clause identical with our
own,72 nor the equal protection clause.73 There is an early Penn-
sylvania case which contains language contrary to these decisions,
but the real decision was that the city which levied the tax had
no power to tax incomes.74 The tax was not graduated, and the
lack of uniformity which the court condemned consisted wholly
of inequality in assessment. Such authority as there is, there-
fore, supports the view arrived at in the preceding paragraphs
that a progressive income tax would not violate our uniformity
clause.7 5
It is a common feature of most income tax acts to exempt
from the tax, or some part of it, a limited amount of all incomes.
The result is that all net incomes not in excess of the stated
exemption escape taxation entirely. Incomes are thus divided
into two classes: those that are not taxed and those that are.
In so far as such form of exemption merely reduces the taxed
net income of those within the second of these classes, it has the
same effect as graduated progressive rates, and since all would
receive the same exemption, that would be its only effect. Hence,
as restricted to that phase, it would not violate the uniformity
clause. Whether it would conflict with some other constitutional
provision will be subsequently discussed. Hence the only addi-
tional problem under the uniformity clause raised by such an
exemption is that involved in the complete exemption of some
incomes from such taxes. The question is whether our uni-
formity clause prohibits exemption of some tax subjects of a
given kind when others of the same kind are taxed. The effect
of uniformity clauses in that respect is a matter on which there
72Ludlow-Saylor Wire Co. v. Wollbrinck, (1918) 275 Mo. 339.
205 S. W. 196.
73W. C. Peacock & Co. v. Pratt, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1903) 121 Fed.
772, 58 C. C. A. 48.74Banger's Appeal, (1885) 109 Pa. St. 79.
"nA proposed income tax might make many other classifications
such as making the rate depend on the source of the income, or tax-
ing individuals by one set of rates and corporations by another. The
validity of such classifications lies outside the purpose of the present
discussion.
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is no very general agreement.76 It has, however, been held that
our former requirement that taxes be "as near equal as possible"
did not prevent exempting firemen from a poll tax, 7 and the
same principle would seem applicable to our present clause. Our
inheritance tax act makes such exemptions, but it was first en-
acted at a time when the constitution specifically permitted it;
eliminating that provision and substituting our present uniformity
clause has not yet been held to invalidate the exemptions. The
equal protection clause treats the grant of exemptions in the cor-
rect manner as a special case of classification subject to the same
principles.78 In view of the fundamental similarity of the prob-
lems under it and our uniformity clause, the inference is valid
that the latter would permit exemptions whenever the exempted
class can be justified under the principles governing classification.
There is, of course, no exact authority in Minnesota on this point
as applied to income taxes, but reference has already been made
to the instances of inheritance taxes and the firemen's poll tax.
The equal protection clause does not prevent such an exemption ;79
and it has been held not to violate a uniformity clause identical
in terms with our own.80 The exemption of incomes of $1,000
or less was held a reasonable classification not conflicting with an
identical uniformity clause."' The exemption of the whole income
of certain classes has been held valid under the same provisions.82
Exemptions of income where tle constitutional provisions as to
income taxes specifically permit it are not in point and need not
be cited. Such authority as there is, therefore, clearly supports
the view that our uniformity clause would not be violated by
exempting a limited amount of all incomes, or by exempting the
entire income of such groups as under the principles governing
76See Cooley on Taxation, 4th ed., secs. 271-273.
77City of Faribault v. Misener, (1874) 20 Minn. 396.
78Citizens Tel. Co. v. Fuller, (1913) 229 U. S. 322, 33 Sup. Ct. 833,
57 L. Ed. 1206.
70W. C. Peacock & Co. v. Pratt, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1903) 121 Fed.
772, 58 C. C. A. 48.
4°Ludlow-Saylor Wire Co. v. Wollbrinck, (1918) 275 Mo. 339,
205 S. W. 196; Standard Lbr. Co. v. Pierce, (1924) 112 Or. 314,
228 Pac. 812. The Mississippi law, sustained in State v. Gulf, M. &
N. R. Co., (1925) 138 Miss. 70, 104 So. 689, exempted incomes under
$2,500; the state constitution required taxation to be uniform and
equal; the point, however, was not discussed although the court did
consider and hold valid the exemption of the whole income of desig-
nated classes.81State v. Pinder, (1919) 30 Del. 416, 108 Atl. 43.
82See cases in footnote 80.
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classifications generally could be put into a class for that pur-
.pose.
Section 1 6f article. 9 specifies certain property that shall be
* exempt from taxation. The usual rule is that such constitutional
provision deprives the legislature of power to establish other
exemptions from the kind of taxes involved in such provision
but not of the power of affirmatively creating exemptions from
other types of taxes.8 3  Our legislature can grant no exemp-
tions from property taxes other than those mentioned in the con-
stitution.8 4  Similar provisions prior to 1906 did not, however,
prevent exempting firemen from poll taxes. 5 It is practically
certain, therefore, that tle constitutional specification of exemp-
tions from property taxes will prevent the exemption of income
from income taxes only if, and in so far as, an income tax is held
to be a property tax. Our supreme court has stated that an in-
come tax is one upon property, but this was in an inheritance
tax case in contrasting the two kinds of taxes."8 This is incon-
clusive and invites a consideration of the authorities. That the
actual -money or goods received as income are property in the
usual legal sense is not, and could not be denied. That is not,
however, the question; that is whether a tax on it is that kind
of a -tax on. property to which the constitutional -provision as
to exemptions has reference. In answering that, the nature- of
income as property in the ordinary legal sense has a considerable,
but not a conclusiire, bearing. It is not legally inconceivable to
view a tax on intome as an excise despite that consideration, and
some courts have done so. The question resolves itself into two
problems: (a) Is an income tax a property tax on the income itself
as property; and (b). is it, in so far as it is imposed on the income
from -property, a property tax on such property? The decisions
have usually either discussed but one of these, or commingled
'the two. The, distinction is not unimportant. If an income tax
,is a property tax on the .income as property, there can be no
exemption from an income tax irrespective of the source of the
,income. If, however, it is a properj tax solely as a tax on the
property from which the income is derived, there would be noth-
"aCooley on Taxation, 4th ed., secs. 661 et seq.
84 Le Duc v. City of Hastings, (1888) 39 Minn. 110, 38 N. W. 803.
.-This case antedates the amendment.of 1906, but applies to the exist-
ing provision.8 5City of Faribault v. Misener,- (1874) 20 Minn. 396.
"oState ex rel. Foot v. Bazille, (1905) 97 Minn. 11, 106 N. W. 93.
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ing in that provision of the constitution now under consideration
which would prevent exempting income from sources other than
property, and the uniformity clause would constitute the only
limit.
The most complete statement of the position that income taxes
are not property taxes has been made by the Mississippi supreme
court. The state constitution required property to be taxed in pro-
portion to its value, and the question was whether an income tax
was a tax on property within this provision. The court's argu-
ment can be summarized as follows: an excise is a charge on
the doing of an act, the enjoyment of a privilege or the engag-
ing in an occupation; since income includes an element of the
production or receipt of income, a tax on it is to that extent one
on the performance of an act resulting in gain to the person-per-
forming it; hence such a tax is not on property though property
be its measure.8 7 The court admits that the money or goods
received as income are property Its position is, therefore, that
an income tax is a property tax neither on the income as prop-
erty nor on the property from which the income is derived. The
Arkansas court has expressed itself on this problem as follows:
"To my mind the distinction is very clear between a tax on
the right to own and use property-which is a tax on the prop-
erty itself-and a tax on the income thereof which is the prod-
uct of such ownership and use. . . . The word 'income' as
used for taxation purposes 'involves time as an essential element
in its measurement or definition, and thus differs from capital,
which commonly means the amount of wealth which a person has
on a fixed date.' . . . The income or gain thus derived from
capital, from property, from labor, or from both combined, be-
cause of its fluctuating and indeterminate nature, during this
period and process of its making, has not yet become an invest-
ment or an increment to the permanent wealth or property of
the individual who has to pay the tax, and therefore is not a
property tax. It is however an income tax, and the one who is
the recipient of such an income may be subjected to an excise or
portion cut therefrom as his modicum of the revenue necessary
to meet the burdens of the government which has guaranteed
to him the right to acquire and use his property, or to pursue
the avocation or business from which the income is derived, and
afforded him its protection for all of these rights while the in-
come was being produced." 88
87Hattiesburg Grocery Co. v. Robertson,. (1921) 126 Miss. 34,
80 So. 4; State v. Gulf, M. & N. R. Co., (1925) 138 Miss. 70, 104 So. 689.88Sims v. Ahrens, (1925) 167 Ark. 557, 271 S. W. 720.
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It was held, therefore, not subject to a requirement that taxes
be advalorem, equal and uniform. It is clear that this court
does not consider an income tax a property tax in either of the
senses above mentioned. Missouri has likewise held an income
tax not a property tax within a constitutional requirement that
all property be taxed in proportion to its value, and the same case
held that therefore exemptions from income taxes did not violate
a constitutional provision voiding all exemptions of property,
other than specified kinds, from taxation.8 9 The Georgia court
has reached the same conclusion °0 The Wisconsin income tax
is not deemed levied on property, but this fact has but slight
importance because of the special wording of the Wisconsin
constitution.9 1
The most complete statement of the position that income taxes
are taxes on property is found in Eliasberg Bros. Mercantile Co.
v. Grimes.92 -The issue was whether an income tax was a prop-
erty tax within a constitutional provision limiting the rate of
property taxation. The argument is in substance that the items
comprising income are property; hence all income consists of
property; hence it is property. The position of this court is,
therefore, that a tax on income is a property tax on the income
as property. The same view is expressed in a dissenting opinion
in the Missouri case cited in the last paragraph. The Massachu-
setts court has held that a "tax upon income derived from prop-
erty is a tax on property."9' 3 The dissenting opinion in the above
referred to Missouri case also adopts this view. A dissenting
opinion in the Hattidsburg Grocery Co. Case cited in the pre-
ceding paragraph supports the same view. Its reasons are that
ownership includes the right to use, that income is the result of
such use, that a tax on the income is thus a tax on the use and
therefore on the ownership and the property itself. All of these
89Ludlow-Saylor Wire Co. v. Wollbrinck, (1918) 275 Mo. 339,
205 S. W. 196.
90Waring v. Mayor, Etc. of Savanah, (1878) 60 Ga. 93.91See State v. Frear, (1912) 148 Wis. 456, 134 N. W. 673. 135
N. W. 164; Paine v. City of Oshkosh, (1926) 190 Wis. 69, 208 N.
W. 790.
92(1920) 204 Ala. 492, 86 So. 56.93Opinion of the Justices, (1915) 220 Mass. 613. The Massachu-
setts income tax levied under the provisions of amendment 44 to the
Massachusetts constitution is deemed a property tax, Maguire v. Tax
Commrs., (1918) 230 Mass. 503, 120 N. E. 162. Since that authorizes
taxes on incomes not derived from property, it would seem that
Massachusetts in practice adopts the position of the Alabama court.
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cases, and the dissenting opinions herein referred to, rely heavily
on the Pollock Cases,94 but these at most support only the view
that a tax on the income from property is a tax on the property
from which the income is derived. A tax on income from a profes-
sion is not on property so as to be a direct tax within the provi-
sions involved in the Pollock Cases. In view of the difference
in the legal problem in them and the state cases, the argument
based on them is exceedingly weak but no more so than the
attempt of the cases holding income taxes not to be property taxes
to interpret some expressions in the Brushaber Case95 as revers-
ing the position of the Pollock CasesY8 Delaware is the only
other state that has held income taxes to be property taxes on the
theory that income is property 9 7
This division among the authorities makes any prediction of
what a court not bound by them will decide extremely hazardous,
despite definite statements in some texts that an income tax is an
excise."" It is probably true that they are not property taxes as
that term is generally understood. Our gross earnings taxes,
though in fact on the earnings, are in theory on the property by
which they are earned. An income tax would not in legal theory
be levied on the property from which derived but on the income
itself. There is, therefore, no reason for analogizing the prob-
lem as to an income tax to that presented by our gross earnings
taxes, but such an argument is conceivable and not beyond the
flexible limits within which analogical reasoning functions in legal
thinking.
In view of the indecisiveness of results derivable from the
authorities, is there any preponderance of reason in favor of
either theory? That the act of receiving income is a conceiv-
able subject for an excise cannot be denied. The right to receive
the income from property is dearly no more a part of the right
of property than is the power to sell it; if the exercise of the
latter is a proper subject for an excise, equally so is an exercise
of the former. The right to receive income from personal ef-
94Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., (1895) 157 U. S. 429,
15 Sup. Ct. 673, 39 L. Ed. 759. (1895) 158 U. S. 601, 15 Sup. Ct.
912, 39 L. Ed. 1108.
05Brushaber v. U. P. R. Co., (1916) 240 U. S. 1, 36 Sup. Ct. 236,
60 L. Ed. 493.96See Hattiesburg Grocery Co. v. Robertson, (1921) 126 Miss.
34, 80 So. 4, and Sims v. Ahrens, (1925) 167 Ark. 557, 271 S. W. 720.
"
7State v. Pinder, (1919) 30 Del. 416, 108 Atl. 43.
08BIack, Income and Other Federal Taxes, 4th ed., sec. 1.
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forts is, no more a part of liberty than the power to enter into
contracts, and should be as subject to an excise as is the latter.
If a tax on a sale is not a tax on the property sold, it is difficult
to see why a tax on receiving the income on property is a tax
on property itself. If the conclusion that a tax on the income
from property is a tax on the property is sought to be derived
from some theory of the ultimate incidence of such tax on the
owner of the property, the answer is that the conclusion is prob-
ably incorrect so far as the income from reproducible forms of
property are concerned, and furthermore, it is unlikely any such
notions entered into the minds of those who framed the consti-
-tutional provisions. The view that income is itself property can-
not be denied, and furnishes the strongest support for the theory
than an income tax is one on property. But there is much to
support the view of the Arkansas court that property taxes have
usually had reference to taxes on capital values as of a fixed
time, and that, since income as property is inconceivable except
as a function of time, a tax on it is not a tax on property in the
sense of the constitutional provisions of the kind under discus-
sion. Such preponderance of reason as there is is rather in favor
of the view that an income tax is not a property tax, but it rests
rather on the weakness of the arguments supporting the other
view than on any positive factors of its own. It is, in any case,
'inconclusive.
There is, therefore, a probability that our court would hold it a
tax on property. If it did so on the theory that it was such be-
cause income is property, it would prevent exempting limited
amounts of all incomes and incomes of stated sizes except in
so far as any income belonged to classes of property :specified
as exempt in the constitution. For instance, income of colleges
used for educational purposes would probably be exempt since
it is inconceivable that a tax on income would be held a tax on
property for purposes of determining the negative aspects of the
specific exemptions in article 9, section 1, and not for purposes of
defining the right of such income as property to exemption there-
under. If, however, the court should hold that an income tax
was a tax on property because, and only in so far as, it taxed
income from property, then, subject to the provisions of the uni-
formity clause, exemptions of income from other than property
sources could be conferred. That would probably meet most of
the situations which are deemed to make limited exemptions
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socially desirable. The only case that directly passed on the ques-
tion in -connection with determining the scope of an exemption
provision was the Missouri case, and that supports the
view that it is not a tax on property. But the matter is far
from certain. Except for administrative considerations, the
problem of exemptions could be met by imposing an ex-
deedingly *nominal rate on the amount of net income it
might seem desirable to exempt; this assumes that the
progressive rate feature is valid. Another device is to include
living expenses up to a certain amount among the deductions in
computing net income. This has, so far as the writer knows,
never been tried. At least there are no judicial authorities on
its validity. The only conceivable objection to it would have to
rest on some theory that some constitutional provision requires
the legislature in defining net income to confine itself measurably
within the limits determined by economic analysis of income.
That any existing provision is likely to receive that construction
is improbable. There is, therefore, no certainty that a constitu-
tional amendment is necessary to permit the incorporation of the
principle of exemptions into any proposed income tax; the only
conclusion possible is that the policy of such exemptions is not
as clearly constitutional as is that of graduated progressive rates.99
It is quite likely that the state might want to exempt certain
property from ad valorem or other forms of property taxation
if it adopted an income tax. This raises several questions that
demand consideration. If a tax on income, from whatever source
derived, is held to be an excise, then such exemption would leave
certain property subject to no property taxation whatever. This
would violate article 9, section 1, except as to property specifically
exemptec thereby, unless it be held that the, imposition of an ex-
cise on the income from property can be considered as legally
equivalent to a tax on such property for the purpose of applying
the rule that our legislature can grant no exemptions of property
from ,taxation beyond those specified in the constitution. The
question is whether that requirement can be satisfied by a com-
99The practical effect of our statute assessing property at lesi
than its full value is the same as would be produced by a statute
exempting a portion of the taxable property within the state. This
has not, however, been held violative of Article 9, Section 1. The
legal theory is that such a statute does not create any exemptions.
It is accordingly doubtful that the validity of this practice would
tend to support the complete exemption -of some income if an income
tax were held a property tax.
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mutative tax. The authorities are not in accord as to whether a
constitutional prohibition against exemptions prevents commut-
ing a tax of the kind to which the prohibition relates for some
other kind of tax.100 It is clear that our own provision does not
prevent substituting a gross earnings tax for an ad valorem prop-
erty tax, but that does not exactly meet the case for the former
is still a tax on property and the only substitution is that of one
measure of property for another, whereas the question is whether
a tax that is not a property tax can be substituted for a property
tax in applying a rule prohibiting exemptions from the latter
kind of tax. To admit such substitution would mean that the
imposition of a corporate excise would permit the exemption
of corporate property from property taxes. It is highly improb-
able that the court would adopt such view. If, then, the income
tax is construed as an excise tax, it is practically certain that no
part of the property now subject to taxation will be permitted to
be exempted. The same conclusion would probably be correct
if an income tax is held to be a property tax on the income as
property. In that case the tax acquires its character as a prop-
erty tax because levied on property other than that which it would
be proposed to exempt, and it is, therefore, unlikely that its taxa-
tion would be held a substitute method for imposing a property
tax on such property which would validate exempting that from
other methods of property taxation. This proposition is not
wholly certain, for shares of domestic corporations can be left
untaxed if the corporate property itself is taxed, a procedure in
many respects analogous to exempting from ordinary property
taxes property whose income is taxed. If, however, a tax on in-
come from property is held to be a tax on the property from
which such income is derived, then relieving such property from
ordinary property taxation would be no more an exemption of
such property than is the case with property now taxed by our
gross earnings taxes. The discussion in this paragraph has as-
sumed that the only property which would be relieved from ordi-
nary property taxes is property the income from which would
be taxable. The mere fact that during some years income prop-
"OThat commutative taxation violates constitutional provisions
prohibiting exemptions, see Millers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Austin,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1919) 210 S. W. 825; The Life Ass'n of Am. v. Bd.
of Rd. Assessors, Etc., (1872) 49 Mo. 512; Hogg v. Mackay, (1893)
23 Or. 339, 31 Pac. 779, 19 L. R. A. 77, 37 Am. Rep. 682. That it does
not, In re Gross Production Tax of Wolverine Oil Co., (1916) 53
Okla. 24, 154 Pac. 362.
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erty did not yield an income would not require it to be denied
such relief during those years, as its right to relief could almost
certainly be made to depend on its character as income property.
There are grave doubts, however, that such relief could on any
theory be accorded property whose primary function was not to
yield income but that of consumption goods, such as household
goods. This might be remedied by requiring their use or rental
value to be taken into income, but no law is likely to go to such
refinements. The validity of relieving certain classes of prop-
erty from ordinary property taxes upon the adoption of an in-
come tax is doubtful if an income tax be held an excise, also
doubtful if it be held a property tax on the income as property,
but practically assured if it be held a tax on the property from
which the income is derived. It differs in that respect from the
exemption of income itself; that is probably invalid if an income
tax be held a property tax on the income as property; also if it
be held a tax on the property from which the income is derived;
almost certainly valid if such a tax be held an excise.
One further problem remains. If an income tax on income
from property be held a tax on the property from. which such
income is derived, there will result a double tax on such property
unless it is relieved of other forms of property taxation. Our
constitution does not specifically forbid double taxation. The
question is whether our uniformity clause or any other constitu-
tional provision prohibits this. In view of the fact that there is
likely to be some property, such as consumption goods, that would
be in substance untaxed by the income tax method, the result
would be some property subject to but one, and other property
subject to two, taxes on property. Though this would be in
substance merely taxing it at different rates, which is not for-
bidden by our uniformity clause, nevertheless there is a high
probability that the accomplishment of this result by this method
would be held violative of uniformity. If, however, by some
device such as suggested in the preceding paragraph, provision
were made for including income from all property within an
income tax, this result would be avoided, and then the question
would be squarely raised whether the double taxation of all prop-
erty was invalid. No authority has been found on this matter as
applied to this particular kind of double taxation, and such author-
ity as has dealt with double taxation has involved situations
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scarcely tonfip:irable:1' 1: There exists, however, a well established
judicial prejudice -against "double taxation,L0 2 " which would. raise
-serious doubts a's to the validity of continuing the existing forms
of property taxes if an income ta x were to be imposed on the
'income from such property.. The fbregoing discussion was predi-
catted on the theory that an income tax be held'a tax -on the prop-
erty 'from Which'the income was derived. If-it-be held a prop-
ert tax, solely because the income on which it is levied is itself
the property taxed by it, then'a tax 'on it is solely on-"distinct
property not now taxed, and aiccordingly no question ;of double
taxation w6uld arise from continuing to tax even income property
under existing systems. The -same is true if it be held an excise.
The only circumstance under which, -therefore, any question is
likely to'arise as-to whether existing taxes on property can be con-
finuied if an incorfie tax on -income from property is adopted is
if 'the -court should hold such tax on such income a'tax on the
property from'which 'such income is derived. If it be so held,
a doubt would exist as to whether it 'Might not be 'required to
abolish existing methods of property taxes for- property the in-
come froni which is made taxable: The question" would'not :arise
as to taxing incomes 'from other sources than property.
Tho preceding discussion warrants the follo ving conclusibns.
There is -nothing in- our constitution that prevents th6 legislature
from selecting income as a. subject 'for taxation, btit an income
tax laW would have to conform to the provisions governing other
tae§. The principal constitutional priovisions that apply are the
uniformity clause :and that relatifig .to exemptions' from taxation.
The uniformity claus'e would prevent ieither. the adoption of the
priftciple' of progressive rates, nor the 'exemption of a limited
amount of all incomes, nor the exemption of' some inicomes en-
tirely. The limits on the legislative powe: to exempt from taxa-
tion resulting from the constitutional specification .of the exemp-
tiqn. from troperty taxes would" prevent exempting income from
lroperty, except as such income would come within the con-
stitutionallyspecified types of property exempted, if an income
iax be held a tax on the propert ' fro which stich income is
-deri4ed , but; if this theory is adopted, income'from sources other
tli n' pio"perty could be 'exempted without violating the consti-
tutional prohibition of exemptions. If, ibwever, an income tax
o'0 See Cooley on Taxation, 4th ed. chap. 5.
102 See State v. N. P. Ry. Co., (1915) 130 Minn. 377, 153 N. W. 850.
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be held a tax on property because levied on the income as prop-
erty, then the prohibition against exemptions would'prevent even
exempting income from sources other than property. If an in-
come tax be held an excise, the only limit on exemptions will be
that provided by the uniformity clause. The legislature will be
able to exempt property whose income is taxed from other forms
of property taxes if such tax be held a tax on the property from
which such income is derived. Such exemption is doubtful if it
be held a property tax solely because a tax on the income itself as
property; while if an income tax is held an excise it is practically
certain that the legislature will be unable to adjust the existing
tax system in that manner. The only circumstance under which
the exemption of property, whose income is taxed, from other
property taxes may be required is if an income tax on such in-
come be held a tax on such property; this proposition, however,
is not as well established as are the others herein stated. It must
be borne in mind that, in the absence of direct decisions on these
problems by our own court, these propositions represent not logi-
cal certainties or necessary conclusions, but indicate the higily
probable action of our court if it should ever be called uponto
decide them. The probabilities have been arrived at by taking
into consideration the factors and kinds of reasoning usually
employed by courts in deciding such matters when there is no
direct authority on them in the jurisdiction involved. The dis-
cussion has aimed to set forth the factors that will have to be
weighed in intelligently considering whether our constitution
must be amended if we are to have an income tax, and in deter
mining just what form that amendment should take. That an
amendment would settle some matters now uncertain is clear,
but that the legislature can do nothing in regard to income taxes
until the constitution is amended is not a well grounded opinion.
It might well be said in conclusion that -a constitutional provision
that has to -be supplemented by amendments every time a new
departure, purely legislative in nature, is contemplated, might
well be subjected to some more fundamental form of revision
than merely adding something more if it should be decided to
change it again.
